2 3

4

5 6

7

9

8

10 11

12

13

14

15

16 17

18

19

20 21

22

23

24

25

## **DECLARATION OF THOMAS HOFFMAN**

I, Thomas Hoffman, declare:

- 1. I am a public safety executive who has been involved in California municipal and State law enforcement and corrections for over 42 years. During my career I served with the City of Inglewood Police Department (1975-1994), the City of West Sacramento Police Department (1994-2004), and as the Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation's (CDCR) Division of Adult Parole Operations (DAPO) (2006-2009). Since August 2009 I have worked as a consultant on public safety, corrections, and parole issues.
- 2. While serving with the City of Inglewood Police Department (1975-1994), I promoted through the ranks from Officer to Captain, working in the areas of Operations, Investigations, Special Operations and Administration. I also served with the City of West Sacramento Police Department (1994-2004) serving as Captain, Deputy Chief of Police and as Interim Chief of Police.
- 3. In 2006, I was appointed to be the Director of the Division of Adult Parole Operations (DAPO) of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. DAPO is the arm of CDCR that is responsible for all parole operations. As Director, I was responsible for policy development, administration, and oversight of an organization of 2,400 sworn and 1,800 non-sworn employees charged with the day-to-day supervision of over 135,000 State parolees. During that time, DAPO was responsible for all programming provided to California parolees being released from prison. Furthermore, during my tenure as Director of DAPO, parole supervision became one of the most hotly debated public safety issues of our time. From 2006 to 2009, DAPO initiated the largest expansion in the number, scope and diversity of post-release rehabilitative programs in its history. During that time, DAPO was also responsible for the implementation of Jessica's Law (the highly controversial and complex sex offender management law), the

development of a validated risk and needs assessment instrument (COMPAS/CSRA), and the development of the parole violation decision making instrument (PVDMI).

- 4. During my tenure at DAPO, I also personally directed the Division's strategy for the implementation of the recommendations of the California Expert Panel (2007) and the Rehabilitation Strike Force (2008). The California Expert Panel was a nationally renowned group of correctional professionals and academics who gathered to conduct an analysis of CDCR policies and practices, and to recommend areas for improvement. The Rehabilitation Strike Force was tasked with offering recommendations for the resources provided as part of AB 900, which provided funding for additional criminal justice facilities to California communities. The recommendations identified in these two reports often served as my personal "roadmap" when I considered a specific policy or strategy for implementing organizational change throughout my tenure as Director.
- 5. Upon my retirement from CDCR/DAPO in August 2009, I was engaged as a correctional/parole consultant by the Adult Parole Operations division of the Colorado Department of Corrections to facilitate the development of a parole violation decision making instrument. As was the case in California, this process was undertaken to ensure transparency, equity, and consistency in the remedies imposed by officers and supervisors in response to parole violations or criminal activity by those under their supervision.
- 6. Since my retirement from CDCR I have also served as an Executive Fellow with the Police Foundation, headquartered in Washington DC. The Police Foundation is a national non-profit, bipartisan organization with a commitment to improve American policing. In this capacity I have served as a primary point of contact for the Foundation's work on the implementation of AB 109 (California's 2011 "realignment" of the criminal justice system), parole reform, sentencing reform, and most recently, the debate about the militarization of the American police.

7. Since October 2012, I have also served as the Senior Public Safety Advisor
for Californians For Safety and Justice (CSJ). CSJ is a foundation-funded non-profit
organization that encourages the development of "smart justice" solutions for local,
county and State organizations. In this capacity, I played a lead role in developing the
campaign strategy for outreach and communication with local law enforcement leaders
and others in the successful Proposition 47 campaign in 2014. I am also working with
the Fontana, Santa Barbara and San Luis Obispo Police Departments as they implement
enforcement programs designed to improve the resources and services available for their
Officers when they interact with mentally ill individuals, disabled veterans and homeless
people in their communities.

- 8. On March 24, 2020, I provided a declaration to the Three-Judge Court presiding over the population remedy in the *Plata* and *Coleman* litigation, regarding the means by which the CDCR can respond to the COVID-19 crisis by reducing the resident population in CDCR institutions, while protecting and promoting public safety. On April 1, 2020, I provided a supplemental declaration to the Three-Judge Court in response to March 31, 2020 declaration of Jeffrey Green, the current DAPO Director. My April 1, 2020 Declaration addressed Mr. Green's statements regarding the pre-release workload associated with releasing prisoners from CDCR. As I stated in my April 1, 2020 Declaration, it is my opinion that CDCR is misusing Mr. Green's description of the pre-release workload to create the impression that releases cannot be accelerated for persons whose release dates are now between 60 and 180 days in the future without impairing public safety. I am very familiar with the pre-release process, having developed much of that process as part of my duties at DAPO Director.
- 9. I have reviewed the discussion of the pre-release planning process that CDCR presented as part of its Case Management Conference statement to this Court on April 9, 2020, Docket No. 3269, at pages 7 through 13. This entire discussion is a one-sided recitation of all of things that CDCR officials believe they cannot do, leaving out all

of the things that they can do. For example, at page 9, CDCR states that "approximately thirty percent of released offenders would probably become homeless if they were not provided housing, and upwards of forty to fifty percent of all released offenders are likely to experience residency instability during their supervision." An agency interested in solving problems would look at the other side of that coin—if 30% would probably become homeless, that means that 70% probably would not. If 40-50% are likely to experience residential instability, then 60-50% would likely have stable residences. Instead of complaining about the 30% likely to be homeless, CDCR should get to work immediately to reduce the unnecessary presence in the prisons of as many of the 70% as possible, as quickly as possible.

- 10. At pages 11 through 13 of the April 10 Joint Statement, CDCR outlines the pre-release steps that would be applicable to the approximately 5,500 persons who are between 60 and 180 days to release. The upshot of this discussion appears to be to discourage any action on the grounds that it would take tens of thousands of hours for CDCR to process the entire 5,500 person group at once. I disagree with this approach because it makes two errors: First it assumes that CDCR would make no effort at all to focus their efforts on those most vulnerable to the COVID-19 virus and/or those presenting the lowest risks upon release. Second, it assumes that CDCR and DAPO must complete every step of the pre-release process thoroughly and perfectly, something that it has never done until now.
- 11. On the first erroneous assumption—CDCR has a wealth of data about the ages and medical conditions of the 5,500 persons now within 180 days of parole that it could use to focus on the most vulnerable first, rather than trying to address the entire group. I have reviewed the Declaration of James Austin being filed concurrently with this declaration, and analyzing some of this data, and showing how with just some filtering of a spreadsheet of 50,000 COVID-19 vulnerable inmates recently provided by

CDCR, it is possible to focus and prioritize the pre-release workload to maximize the beneficial effects in reducing the spread of COVID-19 in the prisons.

- 12. CDCR also has a wealth of data to focus its efforts based on public safety factors. The spreadsheet of 50,000 COVID-19 vulnerable inmates also has risk assessment (CSRA) and risk/needs assessment (COMPAS) data points. Dr. Austin has cross-referenced many of these data points in his declaration to show that CDCR has the chance to further focus its efforts based on risk of violent offenses after release, and on factors such as residential stability. CDCR has an opportunity now to shape its efforts in ways that minimize the burdens on county and local resources, by focusing on persons with high-levels of residential stability (i.e., they have a place to live on release and are very unlikely to end up homeless.)
- 13. The second erroneous assumption is that the pre-release process must be letter-perfect and consume every possible hour of workload for each case. To my knowledge, the pre-release process has never been so perfect in the past, and it is not realistic or prudent to expect perfection during this emergency. Historically, the CDCR and the counties have had tremendous discretion in deciding how and when to administer the various steps of the pre-release process. The entire California criminal justice system has taken dramatic and immediate steps to address the corona virus emergency. For example, sheriffs are releasing people from jail custody to allow necessary social distancing, and police departments are limiting arrests to the most serious offenses. It is imperative that CDCR and DAPO respond with a similar level of urgency.
- 14. Rather than pointing to the ideal pre-release and supervision processes as an obstacle, CDCR and DAPO should be changing the process to fit the emergency. Many of these changes are likely to be more effective in the long-term than current practices and may outlive the emergency as well. Examples of effective measures include:

11

12

10

1314

16

15

17 18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

15. Prioritize the pre-release process for those people within 180 days of
release who are most at risk for complications of the corona-virus due to age or medical
condition. Refine the pre-release review to focus on the CSRA risk assessment score,
and the person's housing plans upon release. The objective is to get people out of the
crowded institutions and into environments where social distancing mandates can be
followed. The other aspects of parole supervision and programming can be addressed
ater when the crisis has abated.

- 16. CDCR should convert the one-time expedited release of persons who were within 60 days of release as of April 1, 2020 to a rolling process. It has now been two weeks since April 1, meaning that there is now another cohort of people who are within 60 days of release for whom the process can be expedited.
- 17. Although I have previously recommended releasing persons from DAPO supervision if they have been free of criminal behavior and parole violations for 180 days, it is clear that CDCR is highly resistant to this option. There are other options available to increase and focus DAPO's supervision resources. DAPO can create a "banked" caseload designation and transfer any person currently under their control that is 180 days or less from his/her controlling discharge date (CDD) to that status. The "monitoring" this population requires (mainly in place to ensure DAPO responds to any adverse contact between a parolee and local law enforcement) can be handled by a nonsworn classification that is supported by a limited number of sworn personnel. This policy shift will create opportunities for reassignment of Agents to respond to the unanticipated new population of Covid19 parolees. It is important to note that County Probation Departments have routinely operated with over 75% of their entire adult population in this status, with caseloads of 300 people to one Officer not being uncommon. DAPO could adopt a similar practice while the pandemic runs its course and society slowly returns to what will likely be a new "normal".

18. DAPO can create a new "classification" of supervision, perhaps referred to as "Covid19". In consideration of the fact the scope of the pre-parole planning process has been reduced, develop case specifications that reflect the current reality in our communities. The supervision strategy should reflect an understanding that the priority for the time being is simply to ensure that the very basic and immediate needs of the person being supervised are addressed. This is not to suggest that being alert for the possibly of criminal behavior not be an aspect of the Agent's daily responsibilities. As the pandemic and its implications on our society and the criminal justice system specifically evolves DAPO can modify the scope and complexity of the oversight and programming of the person being supervised.

19. In conclusion, the processes that CDCR and DAPO have described to the Court are not etched in stone, and can be modified quickly to respond to what is now a very different world from the one we lived in when these processes were created. The persons held in the prisons who are vulnerable to this pandemic—as well as the people of this State who would be harmed if our hospitals are flooded by a surge of prisongenerated COVID-19 patients--need and deserve a higher level of urgency and creativity.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct, and that this declaration is executed at Folsom, California this \_\_\_\_ day of April, 2020.

Thomas Hoffman